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NOTES -
USE OF FORMER TESTIMONY AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Is the constitutional right of confrontation infringed by the use
of testimony obtained at a former trial at which the accused was present
and accorded full opportunity for cross-examination through counsel?
In the recent Montana case of State v. ZachmeierI the defendant was
convicted of murder. On appeal his conviction was reversed. He was
recharged and again brought to trial. At the time of the second trial
the prosecution was unable to locate a principal witness who had testi-
fied at the first trial. Over defendant's objection the trial court allowed
the prosecution to read the absent witness' testimony to the jury sitting
in the second trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and on
appeal the Supreme Court held that the former testimony was properly
admitted.
The effect of this decision is to reaffirm the position taken by the
Montana Court three years earlier in Petition of Tooker2 in which Mon-
tana returned 3 to the majority view. This prevailing view is that the
testimony of a witness given by deposition, at a preliminary hearing, or
at a former trial is admissible under certain circumstances when the
witness is unavailable at the later trial.4
In both civil and criminal cases former testimony has traditionally
been admitted as an exception to the hearsay prohibition.5 Since Amer-
ican constitutional provisions for confrontations were adopted to guar-
antee the maintenance in criminal cases of the principle of the hearsay
... Mont ..... ... P.2d .... (decided April 28, 1969).
2147 Mont. 207, 410 P.2d 923 (1966).
$The first time this question was presented to the Montana court it denied admissi-
.bility. State v. Lee, 13 Mont. 248, 33 P. 690 (1893). The second time it allowed
admissibility. State v. Byers, 16 Mont. 565;41 P. 708 (1895). The third time it de-
nied admissibility in two companion cases. State v. Storm, 127 Mont. 414, 265 P.2d
971 (1954); State v. Piveral, 127 Mont 427, 265 P.2d 969 (1954).
*MCCORMICK-ON EVIDENCE, section 230 (1st e d. 1954) (Hereinafter cited as McCor-
mick, Evidence); 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 'section 1398 (3rd ed. 1940) (Herein-
after cited as 5 Wigmore, Evidence).
'George v. Davie, 201 Ark. 270, 145 S.W.2d 729 (1941); Lone Star Gas Co. v. State,
137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, section 230; Mc-
KELVEY ON EVIDENCE, section 227 (5th ed. 1944). A few courts and Wigmore
view former testimony as a class of evidence where the requirements of the hearsay
rule and the right of confrontation are complied with. Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla.
864, 158 So. 508 (1935); 5 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE, section 1370.
'The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all crim
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him"
The Montana Constitution, Article III, see. 16 provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face
to face."
ILC.M. 1947, sec. 94-4806 states: ''In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right - * * * (3) to meet the witnesses against him face to face."
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rule, prior testimony has been admitted in criminal cases as an exception
to the right of confrontation.
7
There are two purposes to the process of confrontation. The primary
purpose is to secure for the accused the opportunity of cross-examination.
The secondary purpose is to provide the jury an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witness on the stand in order to more accurately
weigh his credibility.8
In recognition of the value of cross-examination in exposing false-
hood, courts have been unanimous in holding that an opportunity for
cross-examination is indispensable.9 Prior testimony, therefore, is not
admissible unless the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness when the testimony was originally given. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas10 held that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of the right of confrontation is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment and that this right is not satisfied
unless there is adequate opportunity for cross-examination "through
counsel.""
Montana, however, seems to be the only state in recent times to
have held that the secondary purpose of providing demeanor evidence
is also indispensable. In the 1954 cases of State v. Storm13 and State v.
Piveral 3 the Montana Supreme Court held that the traditional former
testimony exception to American constitutional confrontation provisions
does not exist with regard to the Montana constitution.
In each of these cases the defendant had been convicted and, on
appeal, had been granted a new trial. In each case the principal witness
for the prosecution was unavailable to appear at the second trial. The
witness' testimony given at the first trial of each case was read to the
jury at the second trial. In each case the defendant was convicted at
the second trial, and on appeal each case was reversed, The grounds for
reversal were identical: the Montana constitutional guarantee of a de-
7Cases are collected in the following annotations: 15 A.L.R. 495; 79 A.L.R. 1393;
122 A.L.R. 425; 159 A.L.R. 1240.
85 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, section 1395; MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE, section 231. McCor-
mick adds a third purpose - to enable the accused to look the witness in the ye,
thereby making a false accusation more difficult.
'Supra, note 7.
"0380 U.S. 400 (1965); accord, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). The facts
in Pointer were that petitioner, unrepresented by counsel, failed to cross-examine
the complaining witness who testified against him at a preliminary hearing before
a state judge. He was later indicted for robbery. Before the trial, the complaining
witness moved from the state. At the trial, a transcript of the witness' testimony
at the hearing was introduced over the petitioner's objections that he was denied
the right of confrontation. The court held that because the testimony had not been
taken at a time and under circumstances affording petitioner through counsel an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, its introduction amounted to a
denial of the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
J1d. at 407.
12127 Mont. 414, 265 P.2d 971 (1954).
"1127 Mont. 427, 265 P.2d 969 (1954).
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fondant to be confronted by the witnesses against him was abridged by
the use of such testimony. 14
The Montana court in both opinions acknowledged the existence of
the overwhelming majority view favoring admissibility.15 But, the court
saw those cases as holding that demeanor evidence is unimportant and
stated that it could not agree.' 6 The court pointed out that demeanor
evidence is of added importance in Montana because of R.C.M. 1947,
section 93-401-4.1' That statute provides:
A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption,
however, may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies, by
the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his character
for truth, honesty, or integrity, or his motives, or by contradictory
evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his credibility.
The court in Storm concluded that since the jury neither saw nor
heard the witness Hay testify, "the defendant was denied the right to
have the credibility of Hay, as a witness judged by the jury; and the
jury had no way of determining his credibility as provided by R.C.M.
1947, see. 93-401.4.' s
In so concluding the majority ignored the fact that this section is
written in the disjunctive and provides five types of evidence by which
the jury can judge the credibility of a witness. Four of the five types
of evidence were presented to the jury to consider in determining the
witness' credibility. Only demeanor evidence was not available. The
court itself relied en the other four types of evidence and weighed the
credibility of the witness.' 9 In rejecting the witness' testimony as un-
trustworthy the court usurped the jury's rule under 93-401-4 of being
"the exclusive judges of his credibility."
Although a defendant is denied use of demeanor evidence-which
may be harmful as well as beneficial to him-the use of former testimony
certainly does not prevent him from presenting to the jury all other
evidence for determining the credibility of the testimony that he would
have been able to present if the witness had been actually present.
The cases allowing admission of former testimony do not regard
demeanor evidence as "unimportant." Rather, these cases point out
that it is a part of the right of confrontation20 and an "advantage to
"tSupra, note 12, at 973 and supra, note 13, at 970.
'1M
"Id.
17Supra, note 12, at 972 and supra, note 13, at 970.
"Supra, note 12, at 972.
"Supra, note 12, at 973 the court stated: "Here the conviction of defendant rests
upon the testimony of an absent witness: A witness whose promise to mail a let-
ter was made with no intention of keeping it; a bacd check artist; an intentional
eavsdropper; and a carrier of information to the sheriff. Certainly a person whom
the average citizen would not trust with anything of value and one who was reward-
ed by a reduction in sentence and immediate release from jail.-
1969]
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be insisted upon whenever it can be had. '2 1 It may be dispensed with
only in a case of necessity. Courts have simply felt that where the
witness-and therefore demeanor evidence-is unavailable, more com-
plete justice will be obtained by admitting the prior testimony as the
best evidence obtainable rather than excluding it all together.
The court in the Storm opinion stated that the Montana confrontation
provision "has but one exception in our state constitution, Article III,
sec. 17. .... ,22 That section provides that the deposition of a person
imprisoned for the purpose of securing his testimony in a criminal pro-
ceeding, may be taken in the presence of the defendant and used as evi-
dence if the witness is dead or absent from the state at the time of the
trial. If the court's statement that this is the only exception to the
confrontation provision were followed in subsequent criminal cases, all
evidence otherwise admissible by way of recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule would be excluded.
Common law exceptions to the hearsay rule have been generally
recognized as exceptions to American constitutional confrontation pro-
visions for over a century.23 One of these exceptions-dying declarations
of homocide victims-was recognized in Montana prior 24 to Storm and
has been recognized since.25  Other exceptions general recognized in
American jurisdictions as not violating the right of confrontation are:
(1) spontaneous or excited exclamations ;26 (2) statements against in-
terest ;27 (3) statements of co-conspirators;28 (4) official records;29 (5)
regular entries in the course of business ;30 and, (6) reputation. 31
When one considers that the evidence admissible under a former
testimony exception was given under oath, in the presence of the
accused, and subject to cross-examination by counsel, together with the
accuracy of modern reproduction methods, it is clear that its reliability
is far superior to the evidence admissible under most of the other
'Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 243 (1895).
"McBride v. State, 368 P.2d 925, 926 (Alaska 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811 (1963).
'Supra, note 12, at 972.
'McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, section 231 and cases cited therein at footnotes 36-39. For
an important article urging that recent developments in the law of hearsay require
consideration of whether the limits of constitutional confrontation provisions can
be relegated to the minimally acceptable degrees of trustworthiness controlling the
admission of hearsay, see JENNINGS, Preserving the Right to Confrontation - A
New Approach to Hearshay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741
(1965).
'State v. Crean, 43 Mont. 47, 114 P. 603 (1911).
'State v. Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679 (1957).
"E.g.,Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
7,E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); Mason v. United States,
257 F.2d 359 (10 Cir. 1958).
'E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949).
'E.g., White v. United States, 164 U.S. 100 (1896).
'Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950); State v. Guaraneri, 59 R.I.
173, 194 A. 589 (1937).
'E.g., Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327 (9 Cir. 1956).
[Vol. 30
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exceptions. In addition, one factor favoring the reliability of former
testimony, even as against the present testimony of the witness, is that
of nearness in time and recency of memory.
Montana's statutory law concerning the use of depositions and
former testimony has also undergone recent change. The new Montana
Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that former testimony
is admissible. Section 95-1802(e) provides that under certain conditions
of unavailability, part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admis-
sible under the rules of evidence, may be used at a criminal trial or
hearing. 32 The last sentence of that section provides:
For the purposes of this section, the word "deposition" shall in
addition include any sworn testimony previously given by a witness
which has been recorded and transcribed by a qualified stenographer
and given in the presence of the defendant and cross examined by
him or his attorney on matters relevant to the trial or hearing
where such deposition is sought to be used.
This enactment is a legislative clarification of the same rule which
existed under a number of earlier statutory provisions3 3 and is applicable
only to those prosecutions in which the crime was alleged to have been
committed on or after January 1, 1968.
It is submitted that the Montana Court acted properly in returning
Montana to the majority rule in the Tooker and Zachmeier cases. Al-
though the court failed to expressly overrule Storm and Piveral in so far
as they made an accused's right to have the jury observe the witness
upon the witness stand an indispensable part of the right of confrontation,
the effect of the later decisions in impliedly overruling them cannot
be denied. The majority in Tooker stated:
"Here the objection made by petitioner's counsel went only to
the fact that the jury 'would not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witness when he was being exam-
ined', and did not go to the showing of absence from the state. We
are of the opinion that regardless of the words of the objection,
the matter of confrontation was before the court, and it properly
allowed admission of the depositions, for by petitioner's very act of
participating in the taking of the depositions, the thoroughness of
the cross-examination by petitioner's attorney negates any argument
by petitioner that he did not have the right of cross-examination of
the witnesses."3 '
The court in Zachmeier stated that Storm and Piveral can not be
relied upon in a case where the trial is held under the new rules of
criminal procedure and section 95-1802(e) are applicable..",
'1R.C.M. 1947, section 95-1802(e).
'3R.C.M. 1947, section 94-7209 provides that rules of evidence in civil actions are ap-
plicable to criminal procedure. Section 93-401-27 (8) provides that former testi-
mony of an unavailable witness may be given as evidence. Section 94-9101, et seq.
(Repealed Ch. 196, Laws of 1967) established that depositions could be used in
criminal cases.
"Supra, note 2, at 929.
mSupra, note 1.
1969]
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After quoting from Mattox v. United States in which the former testi-
mony of a deceased witness was held admissible, the court stated:
"In our opinion what the United States Supreme Court said in
the above cited case with regard to deceased witnesses should also
apply with regard to any sworn testimony where the defendant has
been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness and
where it has also been shown that after due diligence the witness
cannot be found, and his absence was not procured by the party
offering the testimony."'
In both Tooker and Zachmeier the court relied on a number of U.S.
Supreme Court cases holding former testimony of an unavailable witness
admissible as an exception to the confrontation provision of the Sixth
Armendment. 37 By thus applying that court's interpretation of the federal
constitutional provision to the Montana provision, the Montana court
clearly suggests that in the future, exceptions to the federal right of
confrontation will be recognized as exceptions to the same right under
the Montana Constitution.
Although prior testimony is allowed as not abridging the right of
confrontation, its admission is not automatic. There are three require-
ments for admissibility: (1) The witness must be legally unavailable ;38
(2) A proper foundation must be laid; 39 (3) There must be proof of the
accuracy of the reproduction of the testimony.40
Until recently the standards for each of these requirements varied
among the states according to each state's interpretation of its own
constitutional confrontation provision and its local statutes. However,
as noted above, the United States Supreme Court in the 1965 case of
Pointer v. Texas held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental
right made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4'
Thus, the effect of this decision was likewise to make the minimum
standards for admissibility under the U. S. Constitution obligatory on
the states. Since the court in Pointer did not indicate what those stand-
ards are, other Supreme Court decisions must be looked to for guidance.
In Barber v. Page,-2 decided three years after Pointer, the Supreme
(ourt laid down the first post-Pointer federal standard for determing
whether a witness is unavailable. In that case the principal evidence
against the accused at his trial in Oklahoma for armed robbery consisted
6Id.
']Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912);
Mattox v. United States, supra, note 20; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
'Supra, note 9; 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, sections 476-484 (12th ed. 1955).
'Supra, note 9; 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, sections 485-487 (12th ed. 1955).
4 Supra, note 9; 11 A.L.R.2d 30; 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, sections 488-492(12th ed. 1955).
'Supra, note 10.
4-390 U.S. 719 (1968).
[Vol. 30
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of the reading of a transcript of preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness who at the time of the trial was incarcerated in federal prison
in Texas. It appeared that the witness had not been present to testify
in person because the state had not attempted to seek his presence. The
court reversed the conviction holding that a witness is not 'unavailable'
for purposes of the prior testimony exception to the confrontation re-
quirement "unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith
effort to obtain his presence at trial. '43
Prior to Barber various courts44 and commentators 45 had assumed
that the mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction was sufficient
ground for admissibility of prior testimony because of inability to compel
attendance from without the jurisdiction. However, as the court noted,
increased cooperation between the States themselves and between the
States and the Federal Governmnt has deprived this reasoning of its
validity.
46
More than forty states, 47 including Montana, 48 have adopted the
Uniform Act to Secure The Attendance of Witnesses from Without the
State in Criminal Cases. This Act provides a means by which prosecut-
ing authorities from one State can obtain an order from a court in the
State where the witness is found directing the witness to appear in court
in the first state to testify. For a witness in federal custody a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum may be obtained to secure his presence
at trial.49 The reversal in Barber was the result of the state's failure to
utilize these procedures.
In addition to absence from the jurisdiction, other circumstances of
unavailability which have been held sufficient to justify admissibility
include death, 0 illness,5 insanity,5 2 effective claim by the witness of
a privilege not to testify,53 and inability to locate the witness after a
diligent search.54 These cases and the similar circumstances of unavail-
'Id. at 724, 725.
"Cases are collected in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, section 1404, note 5.
'tMcCoR IcK, EVIDENCE, section 234; WIeMOE, EVIDENCE, section 1404.
"Supra, note 42, at 723.
C79 Uniform Laws Ann. 50 (1967 Supp.).
'"R.C.M. 1947, 94-9001 to 9007.
"'28 U.S.C., section 2241 (c) (5) (1964); see Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199
(10 Cir. 1942); United States v. McGaha, 205 F.Supp. 949 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
1'Mattox v. U.S., supra, note 20; State v. Byers, supra, note 4.
"People v. Droste, 160 Mich. 66, 125 N.W. 87 (1910).
"Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. Rep. 95 (1880).
'McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 446, 129 So, 21 (1930) (privilege of wife not to testify
against husband) ; State v. Rawls, .. Or., 451 P.2d 127 (1969) (privilege of
witness against self-incrimination).
"'Petition of Tooker, supra, note 3; State v. Zachmeier, supra, note 1; State v.
Ortego, 22 Wash. 2d 552, 157 P.2d 320, 159 A.L.R. 1232 (1945).
1969]
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ability set forth in R.C.M. 1947, section 95-1802(e), 5 5 must now be read
in light of Barber and subsequent federal decisions.
The Barber case also raises the important question of waiver of a
federally guaranteed constitutional right. The right of confrontation is
a personal privilege which a defendant may waive.56 It may be waived,
of course, by failure to make sufficient objection to the introduction of
the former testimony. 57 The precise question raised in Barber, however,
was whether an accused can waive this right by not cross-examining the
witness at the time the testimony was originally given.
Noting that the defendant could not know that the witness would
be in prison at the time of the trial, nor that the State would make no
effort to produce him at the trial, the court concluded that there was
no waiver.58
"To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances
constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent
trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as
'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.'"'
This language suggest that one might prevent any future use of a
witness' testimony by merely foregoing cross-examination at a prelim-
inary examination or the taking of a deposition. The statement was not,
however, so interpreted in a recent case involving a co-defendant of the
accused in the Barber case. In In Re Bishop6 ° the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma limited the statement to the particular facts of
the Barber case by concluding that an accused's failure to cross-examine a
witness at a preliminary hearing may constitute a waiver of the right of
confrontation at a subsequent trial if the prosecution properly shows
that the witness is actually unavailable to testify and that sufficient
effort has been exercised to produce the witness6t
This interpretation conforms with a* number of earlier decisions
directly holding that the right of confrontation may be waived by
railure to cross-examine when the testimony was originally given.6 2 These
55Section 95-1802 (e) provides that former testimony, so far as otherwise admissible
under the rules of evidence, may be used if the witness is: (1) dead; (2) out of
the state unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party
offering the testimony; (3) unable to attend or testify because of sickness or in-
firmity; or (4) the party offering the testimony has been unable to procure the at-
tendance of the witness by subpoena.
'Diaz v. United States, supra, note 37; Douglas v. Alabama, supra, note 10; Brook-
hart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) ; State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 106 P. 364 (1910).
r'Diaz v. United States, supra, note 37; Cruzado v. Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789 (1954);
State v. Vanella, supra, note 56.
5'Supra, note 42, at 725.
59Id.
10443 P.2d 768 (Okla. Crim. 1968).
"Id., at 769, syl. 4.6
2 Haley v. State, 20 Okla. Crim. 145, 200 P. 1009 (1921); Meyers v. State, 112 Neb.
149, 198 N.W. 871 (1924); State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256, 122 A.L.R.
417 (1939).
[Vol. 30
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decisions and, in addition, Pointer require only that the former testimony
must have been taken at a time and under circumstances affording
petitioner through counsel "an adequate opportunity" to cross-examine..6 1
CONCLUSION
Under the conditions discussed above former testimony is now
admissible as evidence in criminal cases in Montana as in other juris-
dictions. The importance of demeanor evidence is not so great as to
consider it constitutionally indispensable, thereby excluding all former
testimony. However, its value is too great to permit its ommission with-
out requiring the prosecution to use utmost diligence in making witnesses
available. Where the former testimony was given by deposition or at a
preliminary hearing, cross-examination may not have been as thorough
,3 it would be at trial and therefore should not be substituted for cross-
examination at the final trial except in a case of absolute necessity. Fu-
ture restrictions in this area should come through stricter standards
of unavailability rather than wholesale exclusions. As a result of the
recent cases defense counsel has a duty to thoroughly cross-examine a
witness at all stages of a proceeding since that witness' testimony may
be used against the defendant should the witness become unavailable.
T he prosecutor, likewise, has a responsibility to allow full opportunity
for cross-examination by defendant's counsel and to utilize all available
means of procuring a witness' attendance since failure to do either
renders a witness' former testimony inadmissible.
JAMES L. JONES
'Supra, note 10, at 407. A related question raised by dictum in Barber is whether
the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies
the demands of the confrontation clause. The basis for the question is that "' A pre-
liminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of
a case than a trial simply because its function is the more limited one of determin-
ing whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial." The Court stated
only that "there may be some justification" for holding that it does satisfy th.
confrontation clause where the witness is actually unavailable. Supra, note 42, at
725, 726.
1969]
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